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NO. I

SOME ASPECTS OF MARTIAL LAW AND MILITARY
NECESSITY.
By James P. Gregory.*
The entrance of the United States into the Great World War
presents, in acute form, for the first time "in more than a half century, the probability of need, at times, to resort to the application
of certain vital prrinciples -associated with martial law and military necessity. Tle titanic struggle in the Old World has been
waged with such tremendous force and vigor that the contending
nations have been compelled to strain every energy to the utmost
in their desperate efforts to achieve victory. Local and national
laws and constitutional restraints have hampered but slightly any
of the participants, and we, of'America, have been advised, on'high
authority, that the plainest and'most fundamental canons of international law, heretofore a sacred pledge of honor and'a solemn compact of good-will between nations, have been ruthlessly shattered
by at least one of the great belligerent powers. Much is heard
nowadays about commandeering supplies, factories, transportation
lines and what not, under the highly elastic and easily adjustable
plea:of military necessity..* The venerable maxim, "necessity knows
no law," is conveniently invoked, and may now very prope.ly be
amended by this addition, "and military necessity knows still
less."
*Member of the Louisville, Ky.,
vision, Jefferson Circuit Court.

bar and former Judge of the Crimnlial DI-
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With a thoroughly loyal and ardently patriotic people, such as
ours, there will, happily, be little occasion on the part of our Government to commandeer or take, without due process of law, any.thing it may need for the national defense. Our generous citizenry
already, before an appreciable realization is had of what the conflict may mean to us, are with the spirit of the heroes of '76, offering their property, their lives and their sacred honor in defense of
our country. If, during the hurly-burly and stress of war, the
injunction shall not be invoked to restrain invasions of private constitutional rights, it is entirely safe to assume, that in no small
proportion of cases, when such rights have been invaded, post bellum
claims of ample proportions will be presented and clamorously
pressed.
Private property cannot be taken for the most imperious
public uses, without just compensation-is the dual guarantee of
Federal and State Constitutions, fortified by decisions mountain
high of courts of last resort. Shall the Government in case-of imminent need await the tedious and tortuous process of ad quod
damnum, of new trials, of appeals, of the law's inevitable delays, where -some -stubborn citizen refuses to make terms for the
acquisition or use of his property in the national defense? Shall
it, if impoverished with a long and exhausting struggle, when unable to .pay, deny itself the means of protecting the nation? If
it were conceivable, under such circumstances, that a debased citizenry would attempt thus to obstruct or fail to assist the Government in its efforts, there would be little difficulty, aside from
decisions and usages justifying it, to find a parallel in destroying
one, or a dozen men's homes, to prevent a great conflagration or in
throwing overboard a part of the cargo to prevent a loss of all, or
throwing over all to save the ship's crew and passengers. Liberal
as are the powers accorded the Government in times of war and
public peril, our forefathers were not unmindful of the need, even
in times of war, of throwing about both the legislative and executive branches of the Government certain constitutional restrictions
to prevent the abuse of power and tendency toward tyranny, against
which our Government in its every fibre was a most successful and
eloquent protest,
In one of the most energetically contested and exhaustively
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considered cases ever before the Supreme Court of the United
States, ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace, at page 118, in determining the
validity of the trial of a citizen of Indiana by military commission,
.the court said: "No graver question was ever considered by this
court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole
people; for it is .the birthright of every American citizen, when
charged with crime to be tried and punished according to law."
Further in the same opinion, page 120, upholding the right to jurytrial, both under the Constitution as originally adopted and the 4th,
5th and 6th amendments thereto, the court said: "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
clasdes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."
During the turbulent days immediately succeeding the war, two
historic opinions written by Judge Robertson were delivered by
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. In both of these cases the court,
with rare eloquence and learning, defended the constitutional rights
of citizens against any unnecessary invasion under stress or pretense of n.litary necessity. In the case of Corbin v. Marsh, 2 Duvall, at page 194, the court said: "To silence all doubt as to either
its rightful supremacy or the universal and incessant prevalence of
it until changed in the mode they therein prescribed, they labeled
its bosom with the precautionary and unqualified stereotype -- 'THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE
LAND.' Supreme law, when? Always. Where? Everywhere in the
Union. t neither imports nor allows any exceptions." After holding,
that in cases of extreme necessity, the public interest must be recognized as paramount to the rights of private property and that in case
of the destruction of private property, the Government must indemnify
the loser, the court further says, page 201: "In all such eases the
necessity which overrules the law's defenses does not impair its
power of retribution. • And this is all that Hamilton anA Madison
meant, when, in the Federalist, they spqke of the irresistible power
of military necessity, whose individual wrongs no constitutional
barrier could prevent, but constitutional guarantee§ might repair-'
In closing the opinion, 'the court with force and reason says: "We
repeat, that war, in the whole amplitude of its legitimate pwers,
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cannot legalize what the Constitution prohibts, nor destroy what it
guarantees."
The same eloquent jurist, in the case of Commonwealth
v.
Palmer, 2 Bush, at page 574, in discussing the powers of a military
commander to abrogate the laws of the state, under the authority
of martial law, asserts that martial law "never either snspended the
Constitution of the United States or stifled the laws of the state.
What that Constitution and those constitutional laws denounced as
a crime, martial law did not legalize, nor could it have abolished
the institutions, or legally changed the domestic rights and relations
of a noble state, so devotedly adhering to the Union, and so gallantly shedding her blood to save it, and restore its supremacy and
harmony."'
The specific application of these cases belongs to a dark and
embittered past, whose agonies have been assuaged and whose
memories have been consecrated in a reunited country, under the
paramount and overshadowing obligations of a higher and truer
Americanism, but as interpretations of the genius and spirit of our
fundamental law, the principles therein declared will afford a luminous guide for the determination of similar questions in the future
and will strengthen mightily, for all time, the palladium of our liberties.
0

WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.*
By Charles E. Hughes.
In the unusual circumstances of war it is natural that there
should be some confusion with respect to the constitutional warrant for extraordinary action taken or contemplated. Some
altogether misconceive the Constitution. Others vaguely fear
that we are serving temporary exigency at the expense of our
fundamental law, and that we are thus breeding a lawless
Constitution-ignoring spirit which is a serious menace to our
future. Others seek to raise doubts of power in order to em*This is a paper prepared and read by former Justice Hughes at the recent
meeting of the American Bar Association, at Saratoga, N. Y.
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barrass the prosecution of the war. And there seem to be still
others who in their zeal impatiently and without thought put
the Constitution aside as having no relation to these times.
Constitutional Government in War.
While we are at war we are :not in revolution. We- are
making war as a nation organized under. the Constitution, from
which the established national authorities derive all their powers either in war or in peace. Thie Constitution is as effective
today as it- ever was, and the oath to support it is just as binding. But the framers of' the Constitution did not contrive an
imposing spectacle of impotency. One of the objects of "a more
A
perfect Union" was "to provide for the common defense."
nation which could not fight would be powerless to secure the
"blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Self-preservation is the first, law of national life, and the Constitution
itself provides the necessary powers in order to defend, and preserve the United States. Otherwise, as Mr. Justice Story- said:
"The country would be in danger of losing both its liberty and
its sovereignty from its dread of investing the public councils
with the power of defending it. It would be more willing to
submit to foreign conquest than to domestic rule."
Distribution of Powers.
The war powers under the Constitution are carefully distributed. To Congress is given the power "to declare war." The
proposal to add "to make peace"found no favor, as this was
deemed to belong to the treaty-making power vested in the
President and Senate. To the President was given the direction of war as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
It was not* in the contemplation of the Constitution that the
command of forces and the conduct of campaigns should be in
charge of a council or that. as to this there should be a division
of authority or responsibility. The prosecution of war demands
in the highest degree the promptness, directness, and unity of
action in military operations which alone can proceed from the
Executive. This exclusive power to command the Army -and
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Navy, and thus to direct and control campaigns, exhibits not autocracy, but democracy fighting effectively through its chosen instruments and in accordance with the established organic law.
Plenary Power to Wage War.
*hile the President is Commander in Chief, in the Congress
resides the authority "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a.navy," and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," and as a safeguard against military domination the power to raise and support armies is qualified by the provision that "no appropriation
of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years."
Otherwise, this power is unlimited. The 'Congress is to prescribe
the military organization and provide the military establishment,
fix numbers,-regulate equipment, afford maintenance, and for these
purposes appropriate such amounts of money as it thinks necessary.
Power to Pass Conscription Laws.
Upon every citizen lies the duty of aiding in the common defense. In exercising its constitutional power to raise armies the
Congress may enforce this duty. The Congress may call any one
to service who is able to serve. The question who may be called,
or in what order, is simply one for the judgment of the National
Legislature. The power vested in Congress is not to raise armies
simply,by calling for voluhteers, but to raise armies by whatever
method Congress deems best, and hence must be deemed to embrace conscription. To the framers of the Constitution the draft
was a familiar mode of raising armies, as it had been resorted to
by the colonies to fill up their quotas in the'Revolutionary War.
It is true that the proposal, in 1814, of Monroe, as Secretary of
War, to resort to conscription was vigorously opposed as unconstitutional. But the draft was put in force both by the Union
and by the Confederacy during the Civil War, and its validity.
was sustaified by the courts in both North and South. "The
Vower of coercing the citizen," said Judge Robertson, of Virginia,
2n Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt., 470- (1864); "to render mill-
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tary service is indeed a transcendent power in the hands of any
government; but, so far from being inconsistent with liberty, it is
essential to its preservation."
Lincoln's Opinion.
Permit me to quote upon this question the opinion prepared
(although not published) by President Lincoln, which sets forth
admirably the grounds for sustaining the power of Congress to pass
a conscription act:
"In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed, and
others who seek reward in a different way, are very active in accommodating us with this class of arguments. They tell us the law
is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in which the
power of Congress to do a thing has ever been questioned in a case
when the .power is given by the Constitution in express terms.
Whether a power can be implied when it is not expressed has often
been the subject of controversy, but this is the first case in which
the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon of denying a power
which is plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution.
The Constitution declares that 'the Congress shall have power * * *
to raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years.' The whole scope of
the conscription act is 'to raise and support armies.' There is
nothing else in it. * * * Do you admit that the power is given
to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional mode, has not
done the thing in the right way? Who is to judge of this? The
Constitution gives Congress the power, but it does not prescribe
the mode or expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case
Congress must prescribe the mode or. relinquish the power. There is no
alternative. * * * The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a power to raise armies if state authorities consent; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing; but
it is a power to raise and support armies given 1 Congress by the
The pri- Aple of the draft,
Constitution without an 'if.' * * *
which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has
been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the
framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies,
at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that 'the
Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.' *J * * *
Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the
naeecssary means to maintain our free government which our-grand-

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
fathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have already
employed once to maintain it? Are we degex'erate ? Has the manhood of the race run out?"
These are the words of Lincoln, penned in the midst of the
Civil War, in which conscription was enforced; and his reasoning is conclusive. And while the question was not presented
to the United States Supreme Court, the power of Congress was
explicitly recognized in Tarble's case (13 Wall., p. 407, and in
later opinions).
Conscientious Objections.
The constitutional authority thus vested in Congress is not
limited by any qualification arising from religious beliefs or
conscientious objections. These are matters not affecting power,
but policy. As Mr. Justice Harlan said, in delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 U. S.,
p. 29), one "may be'compelled, by force, if need be, against his
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary
interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance
of being shot down in its defense." It is, however, in my judgment, a sound policy on the part of Congress to provide for the
discharge from the draft of conscientious objectors. Nothing, I believe, is gained for the country by overriding the claims of 'conscience in such cases; but it is obviously necessary that there should
be such definitions and restrictions as will prevent imposture and
evasion by those who have as little conscience as they have stomach
for war.
Thirteenth Amendment.
It is now contended in some quarters that this power, which
undoubtedly Congress had, has been restricted or abolished by
the thirteenth amendment, which was adopted after the close of
the Civil War. This amendment provides that "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime,
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdia-

War Powers Under the Constitution.
tion." It has been said by the United States Supreme Court that
the plain intention "was to abolish slavery of whatever name and
form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any
state of bondage; to make labor free by prohibiting that control
by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced
for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude." It hits not only slavery, but peonage. But the language
of the amendment was not new. It reproduced the historic words
of the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory, and its terms, construed in the light of its history and plain
purpose, afford no basis whatever for the conclusion that it interfered in the slightest degree with the power of Congress to raise and
support armies.
In the case of Robertson v. Baldwin (165 U. S., p. 275), it was
argued that the thirteenth amendment invalidated certain provisions of the Revised Statutes authorizing justices of the peace
to issue warrants for deserting seamen. In denying the claim
the court, said: "It is clear, however, that the amendment was
not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain
descriptions of service which have always been treated as exceptions, such as military and naval enlistments." The soldier drafted
under the act of Congress is performing the duty which he owes
of aiding in the common defense, and the constitutional amendment contemplates no escape from the duty to defend and preserv
the United States.
Power Over the Militia.
The power to "raise and support armies" should not be con-fused with the power given to Congress "to provide for callingforth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress in-surrections, and repel invasions"; and "to provide for organizing,.
arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part
of them as may be employed in the service .of the United States,
reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers
and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." The President is Commander in Chief
not only of "the Army and Navy of the United States," but also,
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"of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual
service of the United States."
The militia, within the meaning of these provisions of the Constitution, is distinct from the Army of the United States. "Remember always,", said Daniel Webster, "that the great principle of
the Constitution on that subject is that the militia is the militia
of the -States, and not of the General Government; and being thus
the militia of the States; there is no part of the Constitution worded
with greater care, and with a more scrupulous jealousy than that
which grants and limits the power of Congress over it."
In order to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasions, it would be necessary to
employ regular troops or to employ the militia. And the power
given to Congress with respect to the militia was manifestly to
make a large standing army unnecessary. But as the service
of the Organized Militia can only be required by the National
Government for the limited purposes specified in the Constitution, it follows (as Attorney General Wickersham advised President Taft) that the Organized Militia, a. such, cannot be employed
for offensive warfare outside the limits of the United States.
May Send Army Abroad.
This, however, is apart from the power of Congress to raise
and support a Federal Army. Congress may be content with a
small standing army in ordinary times, but Congress may create
and equip such army as it pleases, subject to the qualifeation with
respect to appropriations. It can equip an army in preparation
for war, and, of course, it may furnish whatever army is required
for the prosecution of the war. The organization and service of an
army raised by Congress are not subject to the limitations governing its control of the militia. The power to use an army is co-extensive
with the power to make war; and the army may be used wherever the
war is carried on, here, or elsewhere. There is no limitation upon the
authority of Congress to create an army, and it is for the President, as
Commander in Chief, to direct the campaigns of that army wherever he
may think they should be carried on. As Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court in Fleming v. Page (9 How., p. 615), said:
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"As Commander in Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade
the hostile country and subject it to the sovereignty and authority
of the United'States."
We employed our arms in Canada in the War of 1812; our
troops were again sent to-foreign soil in the Mexican War and
in the war with Spain, and more recently 'have been employed
in China and Mexico. There is no doubt of the constitutional
authority to employ our forces on the battlefields of Europe
in the war that we are now waging for the safety 'of the United
States and to conquer an enduring peace that the liberties of
free peoples throughout the world may forever be secure from the
aggressions of unscrupulous military power.
Power to Wage War Successfully.
The power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully. The framers of the Constitution were under no illusions
as to war. They had emerged from a long struggle which had
taught them the weakness of, a mere confederation, and they
had no hope that they could. hold what they had won save as
they established a Union which could fight with the strength
of one people under one government intrusted with the common
defense. In equipping. the National Government with the needed
authority in war they tolerated no limitations inconsistent with
that object, as they.realized that the- very existence of the nation
might be at stake and that every resource of the people must
be -at command. Said Madison in.the .Federalist: "Security
against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil
society. It is an avowed and essential object of the .American
Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually
confided to the Federal councils."
And Hamilton said: "The
idea of restraining the legislative -authority, in the means of providing for the national. defense, is one of those refinements which
owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than. enlightened."
He again emphasizes the same-idea in these-words.:. "The eircumstanbes- that -endanger the safety of nations, are infinite, and for
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this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on
the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought
to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances, and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense."
It was in this view that plenary power was given to Congress
to wage war and raise armies. It is also in the light of this
conception of national exigencies that we must read subdivision
18 of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution (following the
enumeration of powers), which gives Congress the authority
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or-in any department or officer thereof." It must also
be remembered that it is of the essence of national power that
where it exists it dominates. There is no room in our scheme
of government for the assertion of state power in hostility to
the authorized exercise of Federal power. The power of the
National Government to carry on war is explicit and supreme,
and the authority thus resides in Congress to make all laws
which, are needed for that purpose; that is, to Congress in the
event of war is confided the power to enact whatever legislation
is necessary to prosecute the war with vigor and success, and
this power is to be exercised without impairment of the authority committed to the President as Commander in Chief to direct
military operations.
Power of the President.
Each of these powers, that of Congress and of the President,
is the subject of a distinct grant; each is the complement of the
other, and together they furnish the adequate equipment of authority for war. There is no more impressive spectacle than
that of the President of the Republic in time of war when, in
addition to the other great powers of his office, he acts in supreme command of the armed forces of the nation and conducts
its military campaigns. It was under this power that President
Lincoln defended the proclamation of emancipation. It related
to those held as slaves in the state in rebellion, and he regarded
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it, as it recited, as a necessary act of war within his authority
as Commander in Chief. He thus expressed this point of view:
"You-say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think
the Constitution invests its Commander in Chief with the law of
war in time of war. The most that can be said-is so much-is that
slaves are property. Is there-has there ever been-any question
that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may
be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it
helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even destroy their
own to keep it from the enemy."
It is also to be observed that the power exercised by the President in time of war is greatly augmented outside of his functions as Commander in Chief thr6ugh legislation of Congress
increasing his administrative authority. War demands the highest degree of efficient organization, and Congress, in the nature
of things, cannot prescribe many important details as it legislates for the purpose of meeting the exigencies of war. Never
is adaptation of legislation to practical ends so urgently required, and hence Congress naturally in very large measure
confers upon the President the authority to ascertain and determine various states of fact to which legislative measures are
addressed. Further, a wide range of provisions relating to the
organization and government of the Army and Navy which Congress might enact if it saw fit, it authorizes the President to
prescribe. The principles governing- the delegation of legislative power are clear, and, while they are of the utmost importance when properly applied, they are not such as to make the
appropriate exercise of legislative power impracticable. "The
legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to
the law-making power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
Congress cannot be permitted to abandon to others its proper
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legislative functions; but in time of war, when legislation must
be adapted to many situations of the utmost complexity, which
must be dealt with effectively and promptly, there is special
need for flexibility and for every resource of practicality, and
of course whether the limits of permissible delegation are in any
case overstepped always remains a judicial question. We thus
not only find these great war powers conferred upon the .Congress and the President, respectively, but also a vast increase
of administrative authority through legislative action springing
from the necessities of war.
Other Piovisions of the Cnstitution-Taxing Power.
The question remains: What may be deemed to be the force
and effect in time of war. of the restrictive provisions contained
in the Constitution with respect to the exercise of Federal
authority? It is manifest at once that the great organs of the
National Government retain and perform their functions as
the Constitution prescribes. Senators and Representatives are
qualified and chosen as provided in the Constitution, and the
legislative power vested in the Congress must be exercised in
the required manner. The President is still the constitutional
Executive, elected in the manner provided and. subject -to* the
restraints imposed upon his office. The judicial power of the
United States continues to be vested in one Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as Congress has ordained. Again, apart
from the provisions fixing the framework -of the Government,
there are limitations -which, by reason of their express terms
or by necessary implication, must be regarded as applicable as
well in war. as in peace. Thus -one of the, expressed objects of
the power granted to Congress, "to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises," is to "provide for the common defenses";
and it cannot be-doubted that taxes laid for this purpose-that
is, to support the- Army and Navy and to provide the means for
military operations-must be laid subject to the constitutional restrictions. That is, all duties, imposts, and excises must be
uniform -throughout the United States, and direct taxes must
be apportioned among the states according to population. And
by the sixteenth amendment, providing that income taxes, from
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whatever source derived, may be laid without
among the states, these taxes fall into the great
duties and imposts and are alike subject to the
geographical uniformity, a requirement operative
as in peace.

19

apportionment
class of excise
rule requiring
in war as well

Treason.
The provisions as to treason are also clearly applicable in
war:
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying
war 'against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort-"
And"the Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
Treason, but no attainder of treason shall work' corruption of blood
or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted."
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
But what shall be said of the efficacy in time of war of the
great guaranties of personal and property rights? It would
be impossible on this occasion to discuss 'comprehensively this
important subject, or even to refer to all these guaranties, but
we may briefly touch upon the question in its relation to -the
fifth and sixth amendments, viz:
'4 No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor shall private propertybe taken for public use without just compensation.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
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formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
Clearly these amendments, normally and perfectly adapted
to conditions of peace, do not have the same complete and universal application in time of war. Thus the fifth amendment
normally gives its protection to "any person." But in war this
must yield to the undoubted national power to capture and
confiscate the property of enemies. This was distinctly ruled
by the Supreme Court in Miller v. United States (11 Wall.,
p. 268), a proceeding brought under the confiscation acts of 1861
and 1862 to confiscate shares of stock owned by Miller, a Virginian, in a Michigan corporation. The court said:
"If the act of 1861 and the fifth, sixth and seventh sections of
the act of July 17, 1862, were municipal regulations only, there
would be force in the objection that Congress has disregarded the
restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution. * * * If, on the contrary, they are an exercise of the war
powers of the Government, it is clear that they are not affected by
the restrictions imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments. This we
understand to have been conceded in the argument. The question,
therefore, is whether the action of Congress was a legitimate exercise of the war power. The Constitution confers upon Congress
expressly power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules respecting captures on land and water.
Upon the exercise of these powers no restrictions are imposed. Of
course, the power to declare war involves the power to prosecute
it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It therefore includes the right to seize and
confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at the
will of the captor. This is and always has been an undoubted
belligerent right."
Martial Law.
Again, in the place where actual military operations are beingconducted the ordinary rights of citizens must yield to paramount
military necessity. This was conceded in Milligan's case (4 Wall.,
p. 127), where it was said in the prevailing opinion:
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"If in foreign invasion or civil war the courts are actually
closed and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according
to law, then, on the theater of actual military operations, where
war really prevails, there is a necessity to. furnish a substitute fothe civil authority thus overthrown to preserve the safety of the
army and society; and, as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until- the laws can have their free
course. "
A different question, however, is presented with respect to
the rights of citizens and others not enemies in places which are
outside the actual theater of war. It was upon the question of
the power of Congress to provide for .the trial of citizens by
military commission in such. places that the justices sharply
divided in the noted case -of Milligan. He was a citizen- of
Indiana who had been tried by a military commission at Indianapolis on a charge of 'aiding the enemy and conspiring against
the Government and had -been sentenced to be hung. -He was
not a resident of one of the rebellious states nor a prisoner of
war, and he had not been in the military or naval sdrvice. The
court was unanimous in the opinion that under the terms of
the act of Congress creating the commission it had no jurisdiction. But the majority of the court went further and declared
that Congress was without power to provide for the trial" of
citizens by military commissions save in the locality of actual
war and when ttiere was no access to the courts. Maintaining.
with eloquent emphasis the guaranties of freedom contained in
the fifth and sixth amendments, the majority of the court asserted that"Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration. * * *
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open and in the
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also
confined to the locality of actual war."
The minority of four justices, led by Chief Justice Chase,
while agreeing that there was no jurisdiction in Mill*igan's case
under the act of Congress, strongly insisted that Congress in
time of war had the power 'to provide for the punishment of
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citizens charged with conspiracy against the United States by
military tribunals, if it was deemed necessary for the public
safety. Deducing this view from the war powers conferred by
the Constitution, the Chief Justice said:
"Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What
we do maintain is that when the nation is involved in war- and
some portions of the country are invaded and all are exposed to
invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine to what
states or districts such great and imminent public danger exists
as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial
of crimes and offenses against the discipline or security of the army
or against the public safety. * * * The fact that the Federal
courts were open was regarded by Congress as a suffeient reason
for not exercising the power; but that fact could not deprive Congress of the right to exercise it. These courts might be open and
undisturbed in the execution of their functions and yet wholly
incompetent to avoid threatened danger, or to punish with adequate
promptitude and certainty the guilty conspirators. * * * In
times of rebellion and civil war it may often happen, indeed, that
judges and marshals will be in active sympathy with the rebels
and courts their most efficient allies. * * * It was for Congress
to determine the question of expediency."
Prof. Willoughby, in a careful review of the Milligan case,
regards the doctrine of the majority as essentially sound, that
the necessity justifying martial law may not be created by legislative fiat. But he suggests that the majority went too far in
the absolute declaration that martial law cannot arise from "a
threatened invasion," and that the mere fact that the courts are
open, regardless of all other conditions, is a conclusive test. "The
better doctrine," says Willoughby, "is not for the courts to attempt to determine in advance with respect to any one element
-what does, what does not, create a necessity for martial law,
but, as in all other cases of the exercise of, official authority, to
test the legality of an act by its special circumstances."
Certainly, the test should not be a mere physical one, nor
should substance be sacrificed to form. The majority recognized "a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority,"
when overthrown, in order "to preserve the safety of the army
and society." If this necessity actually exists it cannot be
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doubted that the power of the nation is adequate to meet it, but
the rights of the citizen may not be impaired by an arbitrary
legislative declaration. Outside of the actual theater of war, and
if, in a true sense, the administiation of justice remains unobstructed, the right of the citizen to normal judicial procedure is
secure.
Citizen's Rights of Property.
Further, with respect to the citizen's rights of property, a distinction may be taken between the unavoidable deprivations
which take place where the conflict rages and those takings,
although for military purposes, which are deliberate appropriations for which compensations must be made. As was said by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Russell (13 Wall., 623) :
"Private property, the Constitution provides, shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. * * * Extraordinary
and unforeseen occasions arise, beyond all doubt, in eases of extreme
necessity in time of war or of immediate and impending public
danger in which private property may be impressed into the public
service or may be seized or appropriated to the public use, or may
even be destroyed without the consent of the owner. * * * Where
such an extraordinary and unforeseen emergency occurs in the
public service in time of war no doubt is entertained that the power
of the Government is ample to supply for the moment the public
wants in that way to the extent of the immediate public exigency,
but the public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending,
and the emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any
Such a justification may be shown,
other source of supply. * *
and when shown the rule is well settled that the- officer taking
private property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully
proved, is not a trespasser, and that the Government is bound to
make full compensation to the owner."
Reasonable Regulations to Insure Success in War.
Distinct from such requisitions from individuals is the necessary regulation of the use of property to secure the successful
prosecution of the war. We are witnessing a new phase of the
exercise of war powers. But the applicable principle to determine the validity of such action is not new. Even'in ti nes. of
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peace we are familiar with the principle of regulation which extends to callings "affected with a public interest." The Supreme
Court, after reviewing the decisions, recently said:
"They demonstrate that a business, by circumstances and its
nature, may arise from private to be a public concern, and be subject, in consequence, to governmental regulation. And they demonstrate -* * * that the attempts made to place the right of publie regulation in the cases in which it has been exerted and of which
we have given examples, upon the ground of special privilege conferred by the public on those affected, cannot be supported. The
underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such a
peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced
upon it the right of public regulations." (German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, -233 U. S., 411.)
The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular businesses and enterprises clearly into the category of
those which are affected with a public interest and which demand immediate and thoroughgoing public regulation. The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity,
those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those
which are absolutely required for the support of the people
during the stress of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable
regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend for
military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war. In the
words of the Supreme Court:
"It is well settled that the Constitution is not self-destructive.
In other words, that the power which it confers on the one hand it
does not immediately take. away on the other." (Billings v. United
States, 232 U. S., 282.)
This was said in relation to the taxing powers. Having been
granted in express terms, the court held it had not been taken
away by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. As the
Supreme Court put it in another case:
"The Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring
'upon the one'hand a taxing power and taking the same power away
(240
on the other by the limitations of the due process clause."
U. S., 24.)
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Similarly, it may be said that the power has been expressly
given to Congress to prosecute war and to pass all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution. That power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential
to the safety of the nation is not destroyed or impaired by any
later provision of the Constitution or by any one of the amendments. These may all be construed so as to avoid making the
Constitution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of the
citizen from unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all hazard
the common defense and the perpetuity of our liberties. These rest
upon the preservation of the nation.
0

WHY RAILROADS DEMAND FEDERAL
INCORPORATION.*
By Laurence B. Finn.Railroads, generally speaking, are the creatures of the states.
Their charters declare that they are public highways and they
exercise governmental functions, being endowed with the right of
eminent domain.
Railroads, like other public highways, can be operated in two
ways.
First. By general taxation; providing a fund to acquire the
highway and collecting tolls or taxes for proper maintenance and
operation.
Second. By granting to individuals charters which privilege
them to collect sufficient tolls from those who use the public highway to maintain and operate the road and to pay a fair return on
the private capital invested in the construction of the highway.
This is commonly known as the tollgate system, which is analogous
to the present plan of operating railroad companies.
Under a joint resolution of Congress a general investigation
is being conducted- on the subject of railroads by a special com*This article was written some time ago for the Kentucky Law Journal.
but because of the delay in starting the present volume Mr., Finn has furnished
us with a revised copy. We suggest a comparison of parts of this paper with
that of James Poyntz Nelson, of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, in Kentucky
Law Journal, Vol. V., No. 4.
t impson County Bar, Franklin, Ky. Chairman of the Kentucky Railroad
Commission; President National Association of Railway Commissioners (1914).

